Fee Simple Determinable

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Fee Simple Determinable

Fee simple determinable is an estate whose duration is dependant upon the occurrence of a particular event. Upon the happening of that event, the estate terminates automatically. E.g. O to A so long as the land is used for agricultural purposes.

Words that suggest Fee Simple Determinable: “so long as” “during” “while” “until”. Upon the happening of the stated event, the property reverts to the grantor.

See Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm. v. Barringer, 88 S.E. 2d 114, 242 N.C. 311 (1955)

"An estate in fee simple determinable, sometimes referred to as a base or a qualified fee, is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land, creates an estate in fee simple and 120 *120 provides that the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated event. No set formula is necessary for the creation of the limitation, any words expressive of the grantor's intent that the estate shall terminate on the occurrence of the event being sufficient. So, when land is granted for certain purposes, as for a schoolhouse, a church, a public building, or the like, and it is evidently the grantor's intention that it shall be used for such purposes only, and that, on the cessation of such use, the estate shall end, without any re-entry by the grantor, an estate of the kind now under consideration is created. It is necessary, it has been said, that the event named as terminating the estate be such that it may by possibility never happen at all, since it is an essential characteristic of a fee that it may possibly endure forever."

Examples:

In Connecticut Junior Republic Association v. Litchfield, 119 Conn. 106, 174 A. 304, 307, 95 A.L.R. 56, the real estate was devised by Mary T. Buell to the George Junior Republic Association of New York with a precatory provision that it be used as a home for children. The New York association by deed conveyed this land to plaintiff, "`its successors and assigns, in trust, as long as it may obey the purposes expressed in the will and as long as the (grantee) shall continue its existence for the uses and purposes as outlined in the preamble of the constitution of the National Association of Junior Republics, but if at any time it shall fail to so use said property for said purposes then the property hereby conveyed shall revert to this grantor, or its successors.'" The Supreme Court of Connecticut said: "The effect of the deed was to vest in the plaintiff a determinable fee."

In Smith v. School Dist. No. 6 of Jefferson County, Mo., 250 S.W.2d 795, the deed contained this provision: "`The said land being hereby conveyed to said school district for the sole and express use and purpose of and for a schoolhouse site and it is hereby expressly understood that whenever said land shall cease to be used and occupied as a site for a schoolhouse and for public school purposes that then this conveyance shall be deemed and considered as forfeited and the said land shall revert to said party of the first part, his heirs and assigns.'" The Court held that the estate conveyed was a fee simple determinable.

In Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church v. Wagner, 193 Tenn. 625, 249 S.W. 2d 875, 876, the deed is an ordinary deed conveying certain real estate. After the habendum clause there appears the following language: "`But it is distinctly understood that if said property shall cease to be used by the said Missionary Baptist Church (for any reasonable period of time) as a place of worship, that said property shall revert back to the said M. M. Wagner and his heirs free from any encumbrances whatsoever and this conveyance become null and void.'" The grantor was M. M. Wagner. The Court said: "When we thus read the deed, as a whole, we find that the unmistakable and clear intention of the grantor was to give this property to the church so long as it was used for church purposes and then when not so used the property was to revert to the grantor or his heirs. The estate thus created in this deed is a determinable fee."

In Magness v. Kerr, 121 Or. 373, 254 P. 1012, 1013, 51 A.L.R. 1466, the deed contained the following provision, to-wit: "`Provided and this deed is made upon this condition, that should said premises at any time cease to be used for cooperative purposes, they shall, upon the refunding of the purchase price and reasonable and equitable arrangement as to the disposition of the improvements, revert to said grantors.'" The Court held that this was a grant upon express limitation, and the estate will cease upon breach of the condition without any act of the grantor.